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 Lawyers,1 scholars,2 and even Congress3 have lately expressed concern 
about so-called “trademark bullies”—trademark holders that assert tenuous 
 
* Professor & Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Conor 
Walsh for research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to 
Address Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 504 (2013) (expressing concern 
that “[current] mechanisms may not effectively deter [trademark] bullying at the pre-
litigation stage”); Category Archives: Trademark Bullying, DUETSBLOG, 
http://www.duetsblog.com/trademark-bullying/ [https://perma.cc/5TQF-JF3A] (archiving 
law firm blog entries discussing examples of alleged bullying by trademark holders); 
Roxana Sullivan & Luke Curran, Trademark Bullying: Defending Your Brand or Vexatious 
Business Tactics?, IPWATCHDOG (July 16, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/ 
07/16/trademark-bullying-defending-your-brand-or-vexatious-business-tactics/id=59155/ 
[https://perma.cc/MZA7-NR4X] (defining trademark bullies as those who “aggressively 
assert rights beyond the scope of trademark protection afforded by the Lanham Act through 
the issuance of threating cease-and-desist letters”).  
2 E.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 629 ( 
“[B]ullying is a serious concern, as it has implications far beyond trademark law and 
impacts the U.S. economy and the freedom of cultural expression.”); Jessica M. Kiser, To 
Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark Enforcement 
Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 211 (2014) (“Trademark bullying harms 
competition and chills free speech interests of those seeking to use trademarks for criticism 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2862812 
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legal claims against vulnerable defendants, who often capitulate rather than 
incurring the expense and uncertainty of litigation. At the same time, we’ve 
witnessed right-of-publicity claims for acts that never would have raised an 
eyebrow a few decades ago.4 Complaints about bullying and overreaching are 
largely anecdotal rather than empirical, so it’s hard to gauge the extent of the 
behavior and to measure its costs. But the fact that it has attracted so much 
attention suggests a perception, at least, that some rights-holders are asserting 
unreasonable claims and chilling legitimate conduct. 
This Essay contends that certain structural and doctrinal features of 
trademark and right-of-publicity law enable and, in some cases, reward 
aggressive claiming. Although the two areas of law have different roots and 
distinct doctrinal formulations, they share some common features that may fuel 
grabby behavior by rights-holders. Normatively, both areas of law have 
gravitated toward an unjust enrichment model, which gives trademark holders 
and celebrities support for a broad sense of entitlement to the economic value 
of their marks and identities.5 At the same time, rights and limiting doctrines 
can be vague and indistinct, making extravagant claims hard to reject out of 
hand. The law, in other words, has failed in its function of giving notice of 
where legal rights end and the public’s right of access begins. Especially in 
 
and parody as permitted by the fair use doctrine.”); Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on 
Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 855 (2012) 
(expressing concern that “[t]rademark bullying engenders a number of costs for society”); 
Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 585, 585 (2008) (explaining that “[t]rademark litigation in America today is 
undergoing a profound change” because of “the use of strike suits and the like to deter 
market entrants”); Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement, 22 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 873, 873 (2012) (“Much academic commentary 
these days concludes that trademark enforcement has become overly aggressive.”). 
3 Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, 
§ 4, 124 Stat. 66, 70 (instructing Secretary of Commerce to report and propose policy 
recommendations on “the extent to which small businesses may be harmed by litigation 
tactics by corporations attempting to enforce trademark rights beyond a reasonable 
interpretation of the scope of the rights granted to the trademark owner”).  
4 E.g., Sarver v. Chartier, Nos. 11–56986, 12–55429, 2016 WL 625362, at *10 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 17, 2016) (affirming grant of anti-SLAPP motion, in right-of-publicity suit filed by 
soldier allegedly depicted in fictional film about troops’ experiences in Iraq); Rosa & 
Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016 WL 25495, at *2 
(11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (ruling on a right of publicity claim based in part on Target’s sale of 
biographical books and movie about Rosa Parks); Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 787 
F.3d 502, 506 (8th Cir. 2015) (“The class action complaint alleges that for many years NFL 
Films . . . has used the names, images, likenesses, and identities of former NFL players in its 
various videos to generate revenue and promote the NFL.”). 
5 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
1328, 1338 (2015) (noting the common view among contemporary commentators “that IP is 
some kind of prepolitical right to which inventors and creators are entitled”). 
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trademark law, this doctrinal creep is exacerbated by other doctrines that 
encourage and reward broad claims of rights. 
If vague boundaries and aggression-promoting doctrines have created the 
current problem, the solution would seem to lie with restoring clarity and 
eliminating rules that reward over-claiming. On both fronts, this is easier said 
than done. Although scholars have proposed threshold doctrines to make it 
harder to prove a prima facie case,6 courts appear disinclined to adopt them.7 
With both trademarks and the right of publicity, judges seem to crave 
discretion to decide whether behavior violates the spirit of the law.8 And they 
manage this by making the letter of the law a set of flexible, fact-intensive 
doctrines that offer little in the way of notice or predictability.9 To make things 
worse, trademark law’s rules rewarding boldness are deeply entrenched, and 
face little counterweight from ethical and legal rules against over-claiming.10 
 
6 E.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1682-85 (2007) (proposing “trademark use” 
requirement in infringement suits); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant 
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414-16 (2010) (advocating threshold materiality 
requirement); Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and 
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (2011) (proposing that courts 
reconcile trademark and false advertising law by, among other things, requiring materiality 
for both); cf. William McGeveran, The Trademark Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 
2268 (2010) (suggesting safe harbors to protect certain speech-related uses of trademarks). 
7 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting “trademark use” requirement in infringement suits); Bd. of Supervisors for La. 
State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(rebuffing a call for materiality: “Whether or not a consumer cares about official 
sponsorship is a different question from whether that consumer would likely believe the 
product is officially sponsored.”). 
8 See generally Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”: Intermediary 
Trademark Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (“The recent history of 
intermediary liability decisions in copyright and trademark law reflects a notable resistance 
to rules that might constrain judicial discretion to ferret out bad guys.”); Stacey Dogan, 
Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two Approaches to Intermediary 
Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 503 (2014) (explaining that 
current doctrine “resembles a roving unfair completion law, leaving discretion with the fact 
finder to assess the intermediary’s culpability in enabling confusion”). 
9 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (endorsing 
“transformative use test” in speech-related right-of-publicity in part “because it provides 
courts with a flexible—yet uniformly applicable—analytical framework”); Network 
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting the need for “flexibility over rigidity” in likelihood of confusion analysis); 
Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We 
must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; 
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”). 
10 See infra Section II.B. (discussing features of trademark law that encourage aggressive 
claiming). 
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Given these structural and doctrinal features, it’s no wonder that rights-
holders test the limits of their trademark and publicity rights in lawsuits, PTO 
practice, and cease-and-desist campaigns. Contrary to the oft-stated trope of 
trademark holders, they do not have to take aggressive positions against 
borderline conduct to avoid loss of their trademark rights.11 But they can obtain 
benefits from taking forceful positions, both in the immediate dispute and more 
generally.12 Whether we view them as bullies, opportunists, or rational profit-
maximizers, rights-holders are responding to incentives and opportunities 
created by judges making substantive law.13 
This is not to condone or excuse those who assert untenable claims. The 
reality, however, is that few of the claims that critics cite as trademark bullying 
are untenable, under today’s permissive standards for infringement and 
dilution.14 And the same goes for right-of-publicity claims, even in the context 
 
11 See, e.g., US Mark Owner Bows to Public Opinion in Monster Dispute, WORLD 
TRADEMARK REV. (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/ 
Blog/detail.aspx?g=956f08e4-f918-4db7-af2d-09957f7fd842 [https://perma.cc/L8DU-2QJ3] 
(quoting CEO of Monster Cable regarding his decision to drop trademark dispute against 
Monster Mini Golf: “This is a landmark kind of situation, as public opinion wins over what 
is the right thing to do for trademark protection of a famous mark. We have made the 
decision that public opinion, and that of our valued customers, is more important than the 
letter of the law that requires us to prevent the dilution of our mark or risk losing it.”). See 
generally Kiser, supra note 2, at 224-32 (“[T]he actual risk of losing one’s trademark rights 
due to a failure to police third party trademark use appears to be highly exaggerated.”). 
12 Such strategies can backfire, of course; as Leah Chan Grinvald has pointed out, public 
shaming can sometimes offer a powerful rebuke to trademark bullies. See Grinvald, supra 
note 2, at 625 (examining the “use of shaming by small businesses and individuals to defend 
themselves against a trademark bully”). 
13 Cf. Kiser, supra note 2, at 218 (“Thus, trademark bullying can only rarely be described 
as meritless and is often better described as unnecessary, inefficient and economically 
irrational.”). 
 14 Indeed, in one of the most commonly-cited examples of purported bullying, the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) initially agreed with the alleged bully. The PTO at 
first rejected Bo Muller-Moore’s application for EAT MORE KALE, on the basis that it was 
likely to be confused with Chick-fil-A’s EAT MOR CHICKIN mark. See Letter from 
Andrew D. Lawrence, Managing Attorney, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 108, to Daniel 
P. Richardson, Attorney for Applicant Robert Muller-Moore (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85412053&docId=OOA20130307115404#
docIndex=26&page=1 [https://perma.cc/ES4R-536B] (“Registration was refused as to the 
goods and services . . . because Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-
for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential customer would 
be confused, mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the 
applicant and registrant.”). It took three years of advocacy before the PTO changed its mind 
and allowed the registration. See Notice of Publication from Comm’r for Trademarks, to 
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of expressive works.15 While we might hope for voluntary restraint by rights-
holders, the only way to ensure such restraint is to clarify boundaries and alter 
incentives. Commentators have suggested a variety of tools for shifting these 
incentives, and this Essay brainstorms about some more. 
Part I discusses the notice failures in the normative, doctrinal, and 
enforcement-related features of trademark and right-of-publicity law. In 
particular, lack of clarity about the purpose and scope of these legal rights 
leads to uncertainty about when the use of a trademark or a celebrity reference 
requires permission. In trademark law, this uncertainty is exacerbated by 
enforcement mechanisms that lack transparency and yet contribute to the 
viability of bloated trademark claims. Part II explores the features of trademark 
law (and, to a lesser extent, the right of publicity) that specifically reward 
aggressive claiming. Especially in light of the substantive ambiguities 
discussed in Part I, trademark law enables and arguably encourages trademark 
holders to test the limits of their trademark rights. Part III explores the costs of 
this phenomenon, and considers some possible responses. 
I. NOTICE FAILURE IN THE WHY, WHAT, AND HOW OF TRADEMARK AND 
PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
As Bessen and Meurer observed in Patent Failure, notice about the 
existence and boundaries of legal rights is critical to any system of property.16 
One need not accept trademarks or publicity rights as “property,” moreover, to 
recognize notice as essential to both areas of law.17 For trademark law, markets 
 
15 The fact that the Ninth Circuit took over two-and-a-half years to decide a case 
involving a movie loosely based on a former soldier’s exploits demonstrates the breadth of 
the right of publicity and the uncertainty about First Amendment protection even for 
traditionally sacrosanct forms of speech. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Sarver Tells 
Ninth Circuit—Hey, Don’t Forget About Me!, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-
commentary/sarver-tells-ninth-circuit-%E2%80%93-hey-don%E2%80%99t-forget-about-
me [https://perma.cc/X3HC-ATRV] (“One of the reasons the Ninth Circuit delayed deciding 
this case [Sarver v. Hurt Locker, LLC] was that it was waiting to see if the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in . . . the case involving right of publicity claims by former student-
athletes on the basis of NCAA basketball and football videogames.”). 
16 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 7 (2009) (“Property can 
fail when boundary information is not publicly accessible,” and “when the boundaries of the 
rights are not clear and predictable.”). 
17 Of course, “notice” plays another, even more central function in trademark law: it 
explains and justifies why trademarks receive protection in the first place. See, e.g., Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (explaining that trademark law 
“quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is 
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) 
in the past”). The notice concerns addressed in this article are related, but distinct: they 
involve the adequacy of notice about the existence and nature of trademark rights, to 
speakers and sellers who might be accused of violating those rights. 
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could not function without some means for sellers to determine whether their 
marketing plans might infringe someone else’s trademark. This requires the 
ability to identify protected marks and to have some confidence about the 
scope of their protection. For publicity rights, identifying the rights-holder 
poses less of a problem, because disputes almost always involve deliberate 
reference to, or depiction of, a known individual. But certainty about the scope 
of legal entitlements is equally important in the publicity-rights context. Fuzzy 
legal boundaries make it hard to assess risks associated with celebrity 
references, which can chill both creative expression and new product 
markets.18 
If clarity of notice is the objective, both right-of-publicity and trademark law 
fall well short of the mark. In part, the problem is rooted in ambivalence and 
ambiguity about the laws’ normative goals. That uncertainty, in turn, 
contributes to legal rights with indistinct boundaries. Finally, particularly with 
trademark law, vague legal standards interact with an informal, non-transparent 
enforcement regime that operates in the shadow of the law, yet (bizarrely) ends 
up feeding back to shape it. On every level—from the normative to the 
doctrinal to the mechanisms for enforcement—notice problems pervade these 
two regimes. 
A. Why: Ambivalence and Ambiguity about Normative Goals 
Admittedly, clarity about normative goals is one step removed from the sort 
of notice that Bessen and Meurer were concerned with—i.e., notice to affected 
parties about the existence and scope of legal rights.19 In the trademark and 
right-of-publicity context, however, ambivalence about the law’s purpose has 
contributed to ambiguity about the contours of legal rights, which, in turn, has 
created uncertainty about whether and when permission is required for use of a 
trademark or evocation of identity. Normative ambiguity, moreover, makes it 
hard to predict how the law will evolve in response to new sets of facts, which 
reinforces the prevailing uncertainty.20 
 
18 Given the prevalence of risk aversion, uncertainty can also lead to unnecessary 
licensing, which can impede market competition and sometimes produce rights-enhancing 
feedback loops. See Stacey L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: 
Publicity as a Legal Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED 
CONTOURS OF IP 17, 36 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (“[T]he 
prevalence of licensing . . . can lead to a market dominated by a single firm.”); cf. James 
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 882 (2007) (“Because liability is difficult to predict and the consequences of 
infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license when none 
is needed.”). 
19 See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 16. 
20 In some circumstances, flexible standards can do a better job of promoting the law’s 
objectives than fixed rules. For this to happen, though, there must be agreement over the 
law’s essential objective, so that decision-makers can apply the standard in a supple but 
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1. Trademark Law 
Although trademark law theoretically follows a consistent normative model, 
in practice, the law has distorted and departed from that model in important 
ways. The dominant theoretical model views trademarks as a means for 
facilitating accurate information about products, with the ultimate goal of 
making markets more competitive.21 With competition as its baseline, the law 
should presume that all parties have equal access to product features and 
marketing tools; trademark law should not intervene unless the defendant’s 
behavior causes relevant harm to consumers, the trademark holder, or both.22 
This suggests, at a minimum, that actionable confusion or misinformation must 
be of the sort that could potentially affect purchasing decisions and/or the 
reputation of the trademark holder. 
In practice, however, trademark law can diverge from this normative vision, 
in two distinct ways. First, as Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna point out, 
courts sometimes lose track of the reasons for blocking confusion, and appear 
to view confusion itself—of any sort—as an evil to be avoided.23 Rather than 
serving as an intermediate step in facilitating competitive markets, avoidance 
of confusion can take on a life of its own, justifying intervention even when it 
affects neither consumer purchasing decisions nor the trademark holder’s 
reputation. In the abstract, avoiding irrelevant confusion might itself sound 
harmless, but as the net of actionable “confusion” expands, a growing set of 
individuals has to make the tricky determination of whether their behavior 
might run afoul of the law.24 When those individuals are causing no harm, it’s 
 
relatively predictable way. When normative goals are in doubt or in internal conflict, this 
becomes more challenging.  
21 See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 (“In principle, trademark law, by preventing 
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping 
and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that 
this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked 
items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 164 
(explaining that “trademark law . . . seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s 
reputation”).  
22 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) 
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the 
utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that 
facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based on alleged inherent 
distinctiveness.”).  
23 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that “trademark law needs to 
refocus on confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions”). 
24 In the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), some courts 
have shown skepticism about granting injunctive relief in the absence of a likelihood of real 
injury from infringement. See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 
F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We now join other circuits in holding that the eBay 
principle—that a plaintiff must establish irreparable harm—applies to a preliminary 
injunction in a trademark infringement case.”); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, 
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hard to justify saddling them with the costs of assessing risk and avoiding their 
(harmless) behavior. Often, moreover, the individuals are engaged in behavior 
that has social value of its own, making legal intervention even more costly.25 
The expansion of actionable confusion has complemented a second, often 
implicit, normative trend toward an unjust-enrichment approach to trademark 
protection. In this view, trademark owners invest time and resources in 
developing their good will, and deserve protection against those who seek to 
exploit that good will without justification, even in the absence of harm.26 This 
rationale relies on Lockean natural-rights reasoning—the notion that those who 
invest their labor in creating something of value deserve to capture that value, 
at least as long as they don’t leave others worse off.27 Several modern 
 
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying irreparable harm standard in 
trademark case); Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., No. 8:15-CV-01010-ODW-MR, 2015 
WL 4694075, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) (applying irreparable harm standard in 
trademark case). It is unclear how widely courts will adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view that 
irreparable harm requires something more than a strong likelihood of confusion. See Herb 
Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250 (“Gone are the days when ‘[o]nce the plaintiff in an infringement 
action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief does not issue.’” (quoting Rodeo Collection, 
Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir.1987))). In any event, the prospect of 
damages makes the threat of an infringement suit costly, regardless of the likelihood of a 
permanent injunction. 
25 See generally William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 253-54 (2013) (“Some courts penalize socially valuable but 
unlicensed use of marks . . . .”). 
26 Several modern trademark doctrines reflect this impulse, including, among others, the 
merchandising right, the federal anti-dilution statute, post-sale confusion, and initial interest 
confusion. See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Harms, Benefits, and Justifications in Trademark 
Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
27 In an important article, Mark McKenna contends that natural-rights reasoning 
provided the primary foundations for early trademark law. See Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) 
(explaining that trademark law originally “sought to protect producers from illegitimate 
diversions of their trade by competitors”). In McKenna’s view, a natural-rights approach 
would limit trademark rights to situations in which direct competitors pass their products off 
as originating from the trademark holder. See id. at 1899 (“Traditional trademark 
protection . . . focused on producers’ attempts to steal away customers from them in close 
competition proximity.”). What McKenna overlooks, however, is that the natural rights 
philosophy contains no inherent, principled limit on the “fruits” of labor that the law can 
legitimately protect. Thus, while nineteenth century courts limited recovery to cases 
involving diverted trade, natural-rights reasoning could just as well support trademark 
holders’ claim to the value of their hard-earned reputation or “goodwill.” And as advertising 
and diversification led to commercial value that extended beyond trademark holders’ core 
markets, trademark holders indeed pushed for broader protection. See generally Robert G. 
Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. 
L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (“Ever since the 1920s, and with greater frequency during the past 
two decades, courts have relied on the idea that trademark law protects against appropriation 
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trademark doctrines reflect this instinct to reward trademark holders for 
developing valuable brands, and to condemn those who seek to profit from the 
value of the trademark holder’s reputation.28 And courts shaping these 
doctrines routinely deride parties for riding on the coattails of someone else’s 
success.29 These courts seem to presume that one goal of trademark law is not 
to avoid harm, but to reserve to the trademark holder the fruits of its 
reputational investments. Absent some justification, in other words, parties 
have no right to obtain benefit from someone else’s good name. 
While scholars quarrel over whether natural-rights reasoning or the 
obsession with confusion drove trademark law’s twentieth century expansion,30 
it seems fair to conclude that the two trends collaborated in enabling trademark 
law’s growth. More important, for current purposes, is the fact that both of 
these trends contribute to trademark holders’ broad sense of entitlement to the 
economic value and meanings associated with their marks. 
2. The Right of Publicity 
If trademark’s compass is occasionally askew, the right of publicity is 
lacking a compass altogether. Doctrinally, the modern right of publicity gives 
 
of goodwill to justify some rather broad, and ultimately ill-advised, doctrinal expansions.”). 
The only limiting principle to the Lockean approach to property lies in the famous proviso: 
that laborers are entitled to the fruits of their labor as long as “enough, and as good” remains 
for others. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 19 (Hacket Publ’g Co. 
1980) (1690). See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538 (1993) 
(“It is because it limits the reach of the concept of property that the proviso serves as a 
central source of significant free speech protections.”). 
28 See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“dilution by tarnishment”); Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 
1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010) (post-sale confusion); Board of Supervisors for La. State Univ. 
Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (sale of 
merchandise bearing mark); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 
Civ. 1611-PKC, 2012 WL 1022247, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“dilution by blurring”).  
29 See, e.g., V Secret, 605 F.3d at 389 (“The Moseleys do not have a right to use the word 
‘secret’ in their mark. They use it only to make the association with the Victoria’s Secret 
mark.”); Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1138 (“Post-purchase confusion creates a free-rider 
problem.”); Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 484 (“This creation of a link in the consumer’s 
mind between the t-shirts and the Universities and the intent to directly profit therefrom 
results in an ‘unmistakable aura of deception’ and likelihood of confusion.” (quoting Boston 
Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989))); Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 
1022247, at *13 (finding likelihood of dilution by blurring when defendant “utilized the 
Louis Vuitton marks for its own branding goals” and “‘was definitely laddering and 
borrowing equity from Louis Vuitton’” (citation omitted)). 
30 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 414 (arguing that trademark law 
needs to refocus on confusion that is actually relevant); Mark P. McKenna, supra note 27 
(arguing that natural-rights reasoning provided the primary foundations for early trademark 
law). 
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individuals the right to prevent commercial use of their names, likeness, or 
other identifying attributes.31 From its inception, the right of publicity has 
derived from an intuitive sense of fairness, rather than any measured analysis 
of why, and to what extent, individuals should have the right to control uses of 
their identities.32 In the opinion introducing the modern right, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the right was necessary because “many 
prominent persons . . . would feel sorely deprived” in its absence.33 Subsequent 
courts have sometimes grappled more directly with normative questions, but 
they rarely settle on a single coherent justification. From natural rights34 to 
utilitarianism35 to unjust enrichment36 to a commitment to individual dignity,37 
courts have offered a grab bag of alternative reasons for giving people the right 
 
31 See Dogan, supra note 18, at 19 (“Haelan invited celebrities to complain any time that 
the use of their name, image, or other identifying attributes enhanced the appeal of a product 
sold to consumers.”). 
32 See id. at 23 (“The court essentially validated celebrities’ sense of entitlement to any 
economic value that their celebrity status might confer to another party’s product or 
service.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn 
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2006) (“In the absence of any clear 
theoretical foundation for the right of publicity, [its definition has] steadily swelled, to the 
point at which virtually any reference to an individual that brings financial benefit to 
someone else qualifies as a violation of the right of publicity.”); Michael Madow, Private 
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125 
(1993) (critiquing the normative justifications for the right of publicity). 
33 Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally 
Dogan, supra note 18, at 23 (“The court, in other words, recognized a right in celebrities in 
large part because celebrities expected the right and would feel ‘deprived’ by its absence.”). 
34 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. of Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity 
value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this value 
whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination 
thereof.”). 
35 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (relying on both 
natural rights and utilitarian justifications: “As such, the goal of maintaining a right of 
publicity is to protect the property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in his identity 
through his labor and effort. Additionally, as with protections for intellectual property, the 
right of publicity is designed to encourage further development of this property interest.”). 
36 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“The rationale 
for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of preventing unjust 
enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant 
get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would 
normally pay.”). 
37 See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing 
claim for damages due to mental distress resulting from imitation of singer’s voice in 
advertisement). Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-
Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005) (advocating publicity right based on interest in 
“autonomous self-definition”). 
  
2016] BULLYING AND OPPORTUNISM 1303 
 
to control the use of their identities. This normative pluralism makes it difficult 
both to define the right’s contours and to balance it against competing 
considerations. 
The result of this normative ambiguity is that people asserting right-of-
publicity claims have a cornucopia of rationales from which to draw. 
Cumulatively, these rationales have led courts to describe publicity rights as a 
broad entitlement to the value of personal identity.38 As a result, celebrities and 
other individuals have grown accustomed to the idea that they have an 
exclusive legal right to exploit their personal stories and/or their fame.39 
B. What: The Malleability and Subjectivity of Rights-Defining Doctrines 
While these normative ambiguities can lead to uncertainty about why we 
protect trademarks and publicity rights, the more direct form of notice failure 
comes from the inability to identify rights-holders and to know how far their 
rights extend. Here, too, trademark and the right of publicity law fare poorly, 
albeit in somewhat different ways. 
1. Trademark Law 
Trademark risks can arise in a variety of different contexts. Sometimes, 
parties considering adopting a new mark or product feature must assess the risk 
that a trademark holder will try to block or challenge their use or registration.40 
At other times, a party knows that a mark is protected, but wants to use that 
mark in some way—to refer to the trademark holder, for example, or to call 
consumers’ attention to competing or complementary products.41 Finally, 
because common English words can also serve as trademarks, parties 
 
38 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Publicity rights, then, are a form of property protection that allows people 
to profit from the full commercial value of their identities.”); State ex rel. Elvis Presley v. 
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“In its broadest sense, property includes 
all rights that have value . . . Today there is little dispute that a celebrity’s right of publicity 
has economic value.”). 
39 See, e.g., Appellant’s Consolidated Open Brief on Appeal at 20, Sarver v. Chartier, 
No. 2:10-CV-09034 JHN-JC, 2016 WL 625362 (9th Cir. Feb. 17 2016), http://www-
deadline-com.vimg.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/SARVER-BRIEF__120824163855.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QJR-KJVG] (brief in support of U.S. soldier Sarver’s right of publicity 
claim, contending that “no social purpose is served by denying Sarver compensation for his 
right to his own persona” in film based on his experiences in Iraq (emphasis added) (quoting 
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576)). 
40 See Gibson, supra note 18, at 882 (explaining that “[trademark] liability is difficult to 
predict and the consequences for infringement are dire”). 
41 See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 
(9th Cir. 2011) (deciding trademark infringement suit against company for advertising over 
search engine results for trademarked keyword of competitor). 
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considering using those words—even for their common English meaning—
may face a charge of infringement.42 
The subjectivity of rules governing trademark eligibility, infringement, and 
privileged use can make it challenging to assess these risks with any certainty. 
Suppose, for example, that a manufacturer wants to copy a visually attractive 
feature of a product—say, a sleek design for a mobile phone. Even the 
threshold issue of whether the design is protectable involves thorny questions 
with unpredictable answers: Does the design have secondary meaning?43 Does 
it perform a utilitarian function within the product, which would make it 
functional and thus ineligible for trademark protection?44 If not, does it satisfy 
the hopelessly indeterminate standard for aesthetic functionality?45 Messy 
questions of protectability, moreover, are not limited to trade dress; the lines 
between “inherently distinctive,” descriptive, and generic marks, for example, 
are notoriously vague,46 and rights in unregistered marks—including, in some 
jurisdictions, foreign marks with a reputation in the United States—can be hard 
to appraise.47 
 
42 See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 
1989) (deciding trademark infringement suit filed by Murphy Door Bed Company against 
competitor bed company for describing product as a “murphy bed”). This list does not 
exhaust the different contexts in which trademark risks arise, of course, but it captures many 
common scenarios. 
43 Trademark law allows protection of product design that has acquired secondary 
meaning, in the sense that consumers who encounter the design view it as an indication of 
source. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (“[A] 
product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary 
meaning.”). 
44 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23 (2001) 
(“Because MDI’s dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress 
protection, MDI’s claim is barred.”).  
45 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 
2571719, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A]esthetic functionality is a limited doctrine that applies 
‘[w]hen goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value,’ [and] ‘definitely contribute to 
that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Auto-Motive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 
1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
46 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 11.66 (4th ed.) (describing line between descriptive and suggestive marks as “hazy and 
only subjectively definable”); id. § 12:20 (“The line between highly descriptive terms and 
generic terms is as fuzzy and undefinable as the line between descriptive marks and 
suggestive marks.”). 
47 Compare, e.g., Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 
(9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing protection for well-known foreign marks when mark owner 
demonstrates, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage of 
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark”), with ITC 
Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155-65 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting well-known marks 
doctrine and concluding that, under the longstanding territoriality principle, federal 
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The indeterminacy, moreover, does not end with evaluating a mark’s 
eligibility for protection. Trademark law’s standards for infringement and 
dilution are equally murky, leaving broad discretion with fact-finders to decide 
whether a contemplated mark treads too close to a protected one. Here, the 
compound visions of trademark law’s purpose exacerbate the uncertainty. 
Doctrines such as post-sale confusion,48 initial interest confusion,49 the 
merchandising right,50 and certain versions of affiliation confusion seem 
designed, at least in part, to prevent parties from evoking others’ trademarks, 
without regard to confusion among customers about the source or provenance 
of products. The standards for dilution by blurring, moreover, target those who 
intentionally call to mind famous trademarks, apparently without regard to 
whether their evocation causes harm.51 
 
trademark protection requires use in the United States). See also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, 9 
N.Y.3d 467, 479 (2007) (“[W]hen a [foreign] business, through renown in New York, 
possesses goodwill constituting property or a commercial advantage in this state, that 
goodwill is protected from misappropriation under New York unfair competition law.”). 
48 E.g., Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 
(9th Cir. 2006) (“Shorn of their disclaimer-covered packaging, Auto Gold’s products 
display no indication visible to the general public that the items are not associated with Audi 
or Volkswagen. The disclaimers do nothing to dispel post-purchase confusion.”). 
49 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (recognizing initial interest confusion doctrine: “Although dispelled before an 
actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill 
associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.”). Compare 
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(refusing to recognize initial interest confusion for product-design trade dress), with id. at 
555 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (proposing initial interest confusion standard that 
would turn, in part, on “whether a product shape identifies its source when viewed from the 
point where the confusion is alleged to have occurred”). 
50 See, e.g., Board of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Th[e] creation of a link in the consumer’s 
mind between the t-shirts and the Universities and the intent to directly profit therefrom 
results in an ‘unmistakable aura of deception’ and likelihood of confusion.” (citation 
omitted)). 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012) (“[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, 
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against 
another person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely 
to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of 
the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury.” (emphasis added)). The preamble to the blurring definition mentions harm. See id. 
§ 1125(c)(2)(B) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from the similarity between 
a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous 
mark.” (emphasis added)). But the factors themselves appear designed to gauge whether the 
defendant’s use called to mind the famous mark. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) (listing 
factors the court may consider when deciding a dilution or blurring claim). 
  
1306 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1293 
 
Finally, although courts have added some welcome clarity to trademark 
defenses in recent years, the standards for nominative fair use and descriptive 
fair use continue, in most jurisdictions, to turn at least part on subjective 
inquiries about the risk of confusion.52 For some uses—most notably, the use 
of trademarks in expressive works—the law appears to be converging on a 
standard that will lead to greater predictability.53 Elsewhere, the question of 
whether a defendant may refer to a trademark holder by its name can turn on 
contextual questions that are hard to assess ex ante.54 
I don’t mean to suggest that trademark law is hopelessly off course or 
producing systematic errors. Most judges deciding trademark cases employ 
measured analysis, and may well reach the right result most of the time.55 My 
point is simply that, given the multiple layers of ambiguity in trademark law’s 
doctrinal standards for eligibility, infringement, and protected use, a wide 
variety of questionable trademark claims can pass the straight-face test. 
Viewed differently, the law offers poor notice about whether and when the sale 
of imitative products, or adoption of marks that resemble existing ones, might 
trigger a cease-and-desist letter or complaint. 
2. Right of Publicity 
In one sense, the right of publicity features less doctrinal ambiguity than 
trademark law, because the identity of the rights-holder is rarely at issue, and 
the right’s broad definition sweeps in virtually all profit-oriented uses of an 
 
52 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“The nominative fair use doctrine allows such truthful use of a mark, even if the 
speaker fails to expressly disavow association with the trademark holder, so long as it’s 
unlikely to cause confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement.” (emphasis added)); Century 
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 231 (3d Cir. 2005) (in nominative 
fair use defense, calling for consideration of “the precise way in which what the defendant 
said, or did not say, other than the mere presence of the mark on the website, may have 
inaccurately implied endorsement or sponsorship”); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. 
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying summary judgment 
on classic fair use defense in part because of genuine issue of fact as to “the degree of 
confusion”).  
53 In particular, we have seen widespread adoption of the Rogers v. Grimaldi standard, 
which allows the use of a trademark in an expressive work as long as it is “(1) ‘artistically 
relevant’ to the work and (2) not ‘explicitly misleading’ as to the source or content of the 
work.” Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 922, 931 (N.D. 
Ind. 2013) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989), and discussing 
its acceptance across various circuits). 
54 See generally McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 25, at 292 (noting courts’ tendency 
to use limiting doctrines “that insist on lack of confusion as a condition of the limitation, or 
they otherwise let their concerns about confusion infect their analysis”). 
55 Cf. id. at 294 (“A doctrine that often reaches correct results, but only by imposing high 
litigation costs, offers cold comfort to most would-be competitors or commentators.”). 
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individual’s name, likeness, or identity.56 Most states, moreover, have specific 
carve-outs for news reporting and other informational uses.57 For many 
affected parties, then, the rules are fairly clear: use of celebrity name or 
likeness in advertisements and merchandise is almost always a violation,58 and 
use in news reporting and other explicit commentary is almost always 
exempt.59 
In between these two extremes, however, lies a murky middle ground of 
behavior whose risk is much harder to gauge. Courts have especially struggled 
with products that incorporate celebrity names or images into expressive visual 
works, such as prints,60 t-shirts,61 comic strips,62 and video games.63 Because 
 
56 See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating 
that California common-law right of publicity “may be pleaded by alleging (1) the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or 
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury” (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983))). 
57 E.g., Fla. Stat. § 540.08(4)(a) (2015) (providing a carve-out for “the publication, 
printing, display or use of the name of any person in any . . . news medium or publication”).  
58 See Dogan, supra note 18, at 29 ( “[P]roducts viewed as pure ‘celebrity 
merchandise’—posters, trinkets, and other standalone products featuring the celebrity’s 
unaltered likeness . . . are consistently found to violate the right of publicity.”). Compare the 
situation in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, where use in advertisements can constitute 
passing off, but celebrity merchandise does not require permission. See generally Stacey L. 
Dogan, The Right of Publicity: A Cautionary Tale from the United States, in THE INTERNET 
AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Susy Frankel 
& Daniel Gervais, eds., forthcoming 2016).  
59 Dogan, supra note 18, at 28 (“At one end of the spectrum lie traditional expressive 
products such as newspapers, books, and movies that offer information, criticism, or 
commentary about the celebrity. These overtly expressive products reliably defeat right-of-
publicity claims.”). 
60 E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding a 
suit by Tiger Woods against seller of limited edition prints entitled “The Masters of 
Augusta” and featuring Woods and other former tournament winners). 
61 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800 (Cal. 2001) 
(ruling on a claim against seller of t-shirts featuring charcoal drawing of Three Stooges).  
62 See, e.g., Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 746 (Cal. 2003) (considering claims by 
musicians against publisher of comic book that depicted two “villainous half-worm, half-
human offspring” whose name and features resembled them); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (allowing claims by hockey player known as Tony 
Twist against publisher of comic book featuring “a villainous character sharing his name”). 
See generally Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask That Eats into the Face: Images and the Right of 
Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157 (2015). 
63 See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 
724 F.3d 1268, 1279 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013) (attempting to distinguish between works with a 
“primary emphasis on reproducing reality” and “other kinds of expressive works” that might 
enjoy first amendment protection); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (“I agree with my colleagues that the Transformative Use Test is the 
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these products derive value from their use of a person’s identity, they meet the 
elements for a presumptive right-of-publicity violation in most states.64 At the 
same time, they contain additional expression that qualifies them for some 
level of protection under the First Amendment.65 As a result, courts have had 
to balance the state right-of-publicity interest against constitutional speech 
interests in these cases.66 It’s here that notice problems have arisen, because of 
the nebulous tools that courts have crafted for balancing speech and celebrity 
concerns. A variety of legal standards have emerged, but in the end, outcomes 
seem to turn largely on judges’ intuitive, case-by-case feelings about the line 
between expression and exploitation.67 
Take the “transformative test,” which the California Supreme Court adopted 
in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,68 a case involving t-shirts 
depicting the Three Stooges.69 In the words of the court: 
In sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity challenge to his or 
her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is 
protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant 
transformative elements or that the value of the work does not derive 
 
preferred approach for balancing these [right of publicity and speech] interests, but we part 
ways on its interpretation and application. The result is that they side with Hart, and I with 
EA.”); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(allowing claims by band No Doubt against makers of “videogame featuring computer-
generated images of the members of No Doubt”); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 607, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting a celebrity suit against distributers of video 
game that presented a distorted version of her persona). See generally Tushnet, supra note 
62.  
64 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that any “(1) knowing use of . . . name or likeness (2) on products, 
merchandise, or goods (3) without . . . prior consent” violates right of publicity in the 
absence of a “valid defense”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (discussing White’s common law right of publicity claim). 
65 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924 (“Cases involving Lanham Act false endorsement 
claims and state law claims of the right of publicity have considered the impact of the First 
Amendment on those types of claims.”). 
66 See id. (discussing “how First Amendment rights have been balanced against 
intellectual property rights in cases involving the Lanham Act and the state law rights of 
publicity”). 
67 See, e.g., Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n.10 (defining test as “whether a likely purchaser’s 
primary motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work 
of that artist”); Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) 
(explaining that the key question is “whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw 
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation 
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question”). 
68 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
69 Id. at 800.  
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primarily from the celebrity’s fame.70 
This sounds simple enough, offering refuge to right-of-publicity defendants 
who can prove either that their work contained significant transformative 
elements, or that it does not owe its value primarily to the celebrity’s fame. In 
practice, however, the standard raises more questions than it answers. What 
kind of “transformative elements” can count in defendants’ favor? Must the 
defendant somehow transform the name or image itself, or is it sufficient to 
incorporate them into a broader expressive work?71 How do we decide whether 
a work’s value derives principally from the defendant’s contributions, or 
instead from the celebrity’s fame? The long opinion repeatedly invokes its 
“transformative” test without answering these questions. Indeed, the court’s 
multiple iterations of its standard offer something for everyone.72 In the end, 
the opinion leaves no clear roadmap, instead leaving it to judges to apply their 
subjective intuition about whether the defendant is engaged in protected speech 
or commercial exploitation. 
Admittedly, the Saderup transformative test offers clarity for creators of 
certain types of expressive works. Parodists and critics, for example, know that 
they cannot face right-of-publicity claims from the target of their reproach.73 
Other visual manipulations or critical uses, including distortions and “heavy-
handed lampooning,” are equally protected.74 Yet beyond cases of direct and 
obvious criticism, commentary, or visual manipulation, the court’s standard 
offers less guidance, and seems to collapse into a subjective inquiry into 
 
70 Id. at 810. 
71 At least implicitly, the court suggests the latter, because it offers factual account 
reporting as an example of a class of works that enjoy First Amendment protection. Id. at 
809. But the opinion never explicitly defines the kind of expressive contributions that can 
make a work transformative under its standard. 
72 See, e.g., id. at 808 (identifying the relevant question as whether a work “contains 
significant transformative elements”); id. at 808 & n.10 (framing the inquiry as whether “a 
work is worthy of First Amendment protection because added creative elements 
significantly transform the celebrity depiction” (emphasis added)); id. at 809 (including 
“factual reporting, . . . fictionalized portrayal . . . , heavy-handed lampooning . . . [and] 
subtle social criticism” as among types of uses protected by the First Amendment); id. 
(“Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw 
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation 
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”); id. (“We ask, in 
other words, whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And 
when we use the word ‘expression,’ we mean expression of something other than the 
likeness of the celebrity.”). 
73 Id. at 808 (“[W]orks of parody or other distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from 
the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity 
and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of 
publicity is designed to protect.”). 
74 Id. at 809. 
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whether the work was unduly exploitative of the celebrity’s fame.75 Indeed, it’s 
not clear how some classic sorts of protected use would be analyzed under a 
transformative standard. Take “factual reports”—a category of expression that 
the court assumes would qualify for First Amendment protection under its 
standard, and that has always been presumed to lie beyond the reach of the 
publicity right.76 Yet the court never elaborates on why factual accounts so 
clearly meet its transformative standard—and one could argue that many of 
them would fail. Suppose, for example, that the “factual report” comes in a 
gossip article in a tabloid magazine, accompanied by an attention-grabbing 
front-page photo of the celebrity. With respect to the photo, at least, couldn’t 
the celebrity argue that the celebrity likeness is the “sum and substance” of the 
work, and that the cover derives most of its value from the celebrity’s fame? 
The Saderup court clearly did not intend to reach tabloids or other     
“news”-oriented uses of celebrity identities. Yet the example illustrates the 
indeterminacy of the transformative test. In the absence of objective tools for 
distinguishing between protected and unprotected uses, the transformative test 
relies on subjective, historically contingent instincts about the line between 
speech and exploitation. The problem with such a subjective inquiry, of course, 
is that exploitation lies in the eye of the beholder. The test has proven 
especially problematic for parties that incorporate visual depictions of 
celebrities into expressive products outside the traditional realm of books and 
news reports. In these cases, courts have increasingly gravitated toward the 
view that, absent some parody or visual distortion, products bearing celebrity 
likenesses violate the right of publicity.77 So far, this trend has mainly limited 
itself to video games and comic books. Based on the success of these suits, 
however, plaintiffs have begun to test the waters with more traditional media, 
including historical and biographical books,78 sports broadcasts,79 and 
 
75 Indeed, with respect to one of its examples of works that likely satisfy the 
“transformative” test, the opinion reflects some internal uncertainty. At one point in the 
opinion, the court mentions Andy Warhol paintings as “subtle social criticism” that would 
likely pass muster. Id. Later, the court returns to the paintings and indicates that, in light of 
their subtle social commentary, the paintings “may well be entitled to First Amendment 
protection.” Id. at 811 (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 809 (“We emphasize that the transformative elements or creative contributions 
that require First Amendment protection are not confined to parody and can take many 
forms, [including] factual reporting.”). 
77 See generally Tushnet, supra note 62. 
78 E.g., Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016 
WL 25495, at *5 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (affirming summary judgment against the Parks 
Institute in its lawsuit claiming “unlawful commercial exploitation of a celebrity” based on 
use of Rosa Parks’s name and likeness in biographical books and movie). 
79 See, e.g., Marshall v. ESPN, 111 F. Supp. 3d 815, 383 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (dismissing 
right-of-publicity claims by college athletes against ESPN, based on use of their images in 
sports broadcasts). 
  
2016] BULLYING AND OPPORTUNISM 1311 
 
fictional80 and non-fictional films.81 These suits have largely failed, but the fact 
that they were filed at all suggests an increasing uncertainty about the outer 
limits of right-of-publicity claims. 
California’s “transformative” test is not the only one used to balance right-
of-publicity interests against the First Amendment. Other jurisdictions have 
applied a variety of other tests that differ from one another both substantively 
and on the extent to which they offer notice of the limits of right-of-publicity 
claims. The “predominate use” test—like some of the language in Saderup82—
asks whether the value of the work derives predominantly from the artist’s 
contributions or from the draw of the celebrity’s fame.83 The direct First 
Amendment balancing test purports to ask—directly—whether the speech 
interests of the defendant outweigh the celebrity’s interest in exploiting her 
fame.84 While they may give different weight to speech and celebrity interests, 
both of these tests ultimately come down to the same subjective inquiry as the 
transformative standard—does the defendant’s behavior have enough social 
value to override the celebrity’s interest in controlling the value of her fame? 
The one test that provides greater structure and certainty—the deferential 
standard of Rogers v. Grimaldi85—has been largely rejected in the right-of-
publicity context.86 Thus, in the one area in which trademark law has moved 
 
80 E.g., Sarver v. Hurt Locker LLC, No. 2:10-cv-09034-JHN-JC, 2011 WL 11574477, at 
*1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting claims by former soldier based on the unauthorized use of 
his experiences and personal characteristic in fictionalized movie). 
81 So far, courts have been unsympathetic to right-of-publicity claims by athletes 
depicted in sports broadcasts and related compilations. See, e.g., Marshall, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 
830 (dismissing student-athletes’ right of publicity claim against sports broadcaster, on the 
ground that sports broadcasts are exempt from Tennessee’s right of publicity); Gionfriddo v. 
Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Balancing 
plaintiffs’ negligible economic interests against the public’s enduring fascination with 
baseball’s past, we conclude that the public interest favoring the free dissemination of 
information regarding baseball’s history far outweighs any proprietary interests at stake.”). 
82 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (“The 
inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and 
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”). 
83 E.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he use 
and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and 
related products rather than an artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances, 
free speech must give way to the right of publicity.”). 
84 E.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (“The law attempts to . . . [strike] a proper balance between the right of a creator 
to the fruits of his labor and the right of future creators to free expression.”). 
85 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Rogers standard). 
86 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]herein lies the 
weakness of comparing the right of publicity to trademark protections: the right of publicity 
is broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests. Thus, it would be 
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from vagueness to relative clarity, the right of publicity has muddled on in 
ambiguity. 
This diverse doctrinal menu, when combined with the subjectivity of the 
standards as applied, reinforces the impression that most cases turn less on 
doctrine than on judges’ personal views about the line between legitimate use 
and exploitation.87 Some courts show skepticism about publicity rights and 
weigh them lightly against speech interests,88 while others view the use of 
name or likeness to enhance the value of a product as inherently suspect.89 As a 
result, beyond the conventional worlds of advertising (at one end) and news 
accounts (at the other), the law offers inadequate notice of when the use of a 
celebrity name or likeness supports a right-of-publicity claim. 
C. How: Notice Failure In Enforcement Practice 
So far, this Part has demonstrated that both trademark and right-of-publicity 
law offer inadequate notice about the existence and scope of legal entitlements. 
As a result, parties considering adopting trademarks, or incorporating 
individuals’ identities into their expressive works, often cannot predict, with 
confidence, whether they will run afoul of someone else’s legal rights. 
Particularly in trademark law, this substantive notice failure is compounded 
by a lack of transparency in the mechanisms for enforcing trademark rights. 
While statistics are hard to come by, commentators agree that the vast majority 
 
unwise for us to adopt a test [from Rogers] that hews so closely to traditional trademark 
principles.” (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004)). 
87 Compare, for example, the sports video game cases with Noriega. Compare, e.g., 
Hart, 717 F.3d at 154 (“Appellant’s claims stemmed from Appellee’s alleged use of his 
likeness and biographical information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.”), with 
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC-551747, 2014 WL 5930149 at *1 (Cal. Super. 
2014) (“The complaint . . . contends that defendants: (1) designed, created, advertised and 
sold the popular video game ‘Call of Duty: Black Ops II;’ . . . [and] ‘engaged in the blatant 
misuse, unlawful exploitation and misappropriation of plaintiff’s image and likeness for 
economic gain.’”). Both cases involved very similar likenesses of the depicted parties, but 
the college football players tended to win, while Noriega lost, based on the same 
“transformative” test. Compare, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 168 (“[W]e consider whether the 
type and extent of [video game player] interactivity permitted is sufficient to transform the 
Appellant’s likeness into the Appellee’s own expression. We hold that it does not.” 
(emphasis added)), with Noriega, 2014 WL 5930149, at *4 (“[E]vidence compels the 
conclusion that defendants’ use of Noriega’s likeness was transformative. . . . [T]he 
marketability and economic value of the challenged work in this case comes not from 
Noriega, but from the creativity, skill and reputation of defendants.”). 
88 E.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972 (“Cardtoons’ interest in publishing its parody trading 
cards implicates some of the core concerns of the First Amendment.”). 
89 E.g., White v. Samsung Elec. of Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity 
value to exploit it for profit. The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit this 
value . . . .”). 
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of trademark enforcement happens through cease-and-desist letters sent to 
parties that have used marks or applied to register them.90 By all accounts, 
many recipients of these letters back down without regard to the merits of the 
claim against them. William Gallagher, Irina Manta, Leah Chan Grinvald, 
Kenneth Port, and others have explored the structural reasons for this 
widespread capitulation, which often boil down to an unwillingness to endure 
the expense and uncertainty of prolonged litigation brought by deep-pocketed 
plaintiffs.91 The notice failures identified above play a critical role in 
recipients’ unwillingness to fight: given the vagaries of trademark rules, many 
businesses would rather change their marketing plans ex ante than engage in 
protracted battle with uncertain outcomes.92 
This shadowy, pervasive cease-and-desist practice is not only enabled by 
trademark law’s notice failures, but it also exacerbates them, by creating an 
impression of broader rights than the law provides. Cease-and-desist letters 
routinely include lists of other parties that have surrendered to the trademark 
holder’s demands to abandon their marks.93 Such lists can leave the impression 
that the trademark holder had the legal right to force each of these surrenders, 
even though most of them resulted, not from any judicial decision, but from a 
blend of legal ambiguity and risk aversion.94 Part II, below, discusses the ways 
in which successful cease-and-desist practice can actually expand the 
 
90 William Gallagher’s qualitative empirical study, based on interviews with intellectual 
property lawyers, supports the notion that most trademark disputes are resolved through 
cease-and-desist letters followed by private negotiation. See William T. Gallagher, 
Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 453 (2012) (“‘Cease and desist’ letters, phone calls, and 
negotiations with alleged infringers constitute the bulk of IP enforcement efforts in 
trademark and copyright practice.”); see also Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-
Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 411 (2015) (“Statistics show that approximately only 
three percent of all legal disputes are brought to the judicial system.” (citation omitted)).  
91 See generally supra notes 2, 90; see also Gibson, supra note 18. 
92 This is especially true for parties that have filed an intent-to-use application to register 
a mark that they have not yet adopted. The cost of selecting and adopting a different 
trademark may pale in comparison to the cost of re-branding in the event of an injunction or 
ultimate PTO rejection. And while PTO proceedings move more quickly than federal court 
litigation, final resolution can take years—too long to put branding and marketing plans on 
hold. Cf. Classic Liquor Imps., Ltd. v. Spirits Int’l B.V., No. 15 Civ. 6503 JSR, 2015 WL 
9487886, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2015) (referencing efforts by established firm to 
disrupt upstart competitor’s adoption of trademark, and allowing declaratory judgment 
action to resolve parties’ relative rights). 
93 E.g., Letter from Auma N. Reggy, Attorney for Chick-fil-A, to Daniel P. Richardson, 
Attorney for Bo Muller-Moore 3 (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
74942618/Chick-fil-A-2011-C-D-Letter-Over-Eat-More-Kale#download [https://perma.cc/ 
7HG9-6K9V] (listing thirty marks “in which the owners/users . . . agreed to cease and desist 
their use,” including EAT MORE VEGETABLES and EAT MORE BEER). 
94 See generally Gibson, supra note 18, at 901 (“Even when the argument for liability is 
weak, the letter’s recipient knows that he or she can no longer hope to proceed unnoticed.”). 
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substantive scope of trademark rights. Even apart from that effect, however, 
the track record of success can appear, to recipients, like a common-law record 
of outcomes in conflicts involving the mark. When this happens, the cease-
and-desist letter has a multiplier effect: not only has it convinced the current 
target to back down from its use, but it also fortifies the mark-holder’s 
credibility with future targets. The non-transparency of trademark law’s cease-
and-desist tradition, in other words, can magnify the effects of uncertainty and 
risk aversion, making it even more difficult for users of trademarks to assess 
the legitimacy and legality of their use. 
II. EXACERBATING DOCTRINES AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
Given the combination of substantive and procedural features discussed 
above, trademark and right of publicity law arguably give insufficient guidance 
about when the use of a trademark, or depiction of a person, requires 
permission (or should simply be avoided). Rights-holders have a broad zone of 
plausibility for their trademark and right-of-publicity claims; especially in 
trademark law, the ratcheting effect of cease-and-desist practice can create the 
illusion of even more elastic limits. 
This Part contends that a combination of rhetoric, economics and legal rules 
creates incentives for right-holders to test the outer limits of their legal rights—
and indeed, that aggression can pay by expanding the legal entitlement. In the 
right-of-publicity context, the explanation is straightforward: individuals have 
a direct economic interest—sometimes complemented by dignity or moral 
concerns—in exploiting their identity to the greatest extent possible, and right-
of-publicity rhetoric gives them a sense of entitlement to the value of their 
fame. Trademark law shares these economic incentives, but adds two twists: a 
misunderstanding of policing obligations among trademark holders, combined 
with rules that effectively enlarge the legal interests of parties that stake broad 
claims. Given that, it is unsurprising that trademark holders assert claims 
against a wide range of uses, even in the absence of harm. 
A. Right-of-Publicity Incentives 
As discussed above, the rhetoric of right-of-publicity law starts with a 
presumption that celebrities own the economic value associated with their 
fame. While speech interests can sometimes overcome that presumption, courts 
evaluate them on a case-by-case basis, under subjective and indeterminate 
standards that make outcomes hard to predict. The same uncertainties that 
make it hard for creators to gauge the risks associated with expressive works 
offer at least a prospect of success for depicted parties to block or profit from 
the challenged use of their identity. For a variety of reasons, this prospect may 
be sufficient to trigger claims that test the limits of legal doctrine, even when 
the stakes of a particular lawsuit appear small. 
First, for some “franchise” plaintiffs whose identity has broad appeal to 
consumers across a range of different products, a successful right-of-publicity 
action may solidify licensing markets that extend well beyond that case. Take 
  
2016] BULLYING AND OPPORTUNISM 1315 
 
the recent lawsuit by the Rosa & Raymond Parks Institute against Target, 
based on the sale of books, movies, and plaques bearing Rosa Parks’s name 
and likeness.95 Parks’s foundation claimed that Target’s sale of these 
products—and its use of her name and image in advertising those products—
violated her right of publicity.96 Both the trial court and the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the claims, invoking a “qualified privilege to report on matters in the 
public interest . . . deeply rooted in Michigan jurisprudence.”97 Had the claims 
succeeded, however, the Parks foundation would have been entitled to 
licensing fees from a vast array of civil-rights-related expressive works and 
merchandise sold by Target and other vendors. Even with a low likelihood of 
success, then, the expected gains from the lawsuit may have exceeded the costs 
of bringing it, which could explain this otherwise perplexing litigation. 
The interest in protecting broad licensing markets also undoubtedly explains 
Comedy III v. Saderup, a lawsuit against an artist who sold silkscreen t-shirts 
with images of the Three Stooges.98 C3 Entertainment, Inc., the assignee of the 
Three Stooges’ publicity rights, has a robust licensing program “with many 
diverse licensees offering thousands of different products and services all over 
the world . . . .”99 The California Supreme Court’s decision in Saderup—that a 
t-shirt made from a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges violated their right 
of publicity100—gave C3 a sturdy foundation for its active (and, presumably, 
profitable) licensing campaign. 
A second factor that may explain some recent right-of-publicity gambles is 
their suitability for class-action status. Many mass-produced expressive works, 
especially in the sports context, involve numerous, similarly situated parties 
whose claims can be resolved as a class.101 While each class member may have 
an insignificant expected recovery,102 the aggregate damages from a successful 
 
95 Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., No. 15-10880, 2016 WL 
25495, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016). 
96 Id. at *2. The lawsuit also included claims of unfair competition and unjust 
enrichment. Id. 
97 Id. at *4 (quoting Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 398 N.W.2d 245, 253 
(Mich. 1986)); Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 
1256, 1264-65 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“Michigan courts . . . have applied the legitimate public 
interest privilege to instances where the misappropriation occurred for the purposes of 
making a profit.”), aff’d, No. 15-10880, 2016 WL 25495 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2016). 
98 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
99 Licensing, C3 ENTERTAINMENT, INC., http://www.threestooges.com/licensing/ 
[https://perma.cc/QNF9-XXZ3].  
100 Saderup, 21 P.3d at 811. 
101 E.g., Marshall v. Nat’l. Football League, 787 F.3d 502, 505-06 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(deciding suit filed by a class of former NFL players alleging that the League violated their 
publicity rights by selling films with game footage). 
102 Individual student-athletes have earned fairly small recoveries in their right-of-
publicity suit against video game manufacturers. See Jon Solomon, Current NCAA Players 
Could Benefit from Video Game Settlement, CBS SPORTS (May 31, 2014), 
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action would be substantial, making them attractive candidates for class-action 
plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
Finally, factors other than economics clearly play a role in some right-of-
publicity suits. For college athletes who feel exploited by video games that 
bring revenues to the NCAA but not to them, lawsuits offer the opportunity to 
vindicate their frustration with the NCAA’s amateurism rules.103 And for 
plaintiffs like Jeffrey Sarver, a lawsuit offers the opportunity to object to a 
fictionalized account that allegedly portrayed him (or, more accurately, a 
character based on him) as a “mad, foolish, crazy, wild, mentally ill man, who 
will recklessly risk his and others’ lives because of an addiction / fascination 
with death.”104 
B. Trademark Doctrine and the Benefits of Sharp Elbows 
The vagueness of trademark law’s boundaries helps to explain why even 
questionable trademark claims have a veneer of plausibility, giving accused 
parties little certainty about legal risks associated with their use of a mark. 
Trademark holders, of course, have plenty of financial incentive to assert many 
of these claims, particularly through cheap and easy cease-and-desist letters. 
Sometimes, the claims are an attempt to avoid competition, or to maximize 
licensing revenues associated with their marks. The National Football League, 
for example, is notorious for objecting to any mention of the Super Bowl in 
non-officially-licensed advertising.105 Although the nominative fair use 
doctrine would protect many Super Bowl references in ads, the League has 
succeeded in intimidating advertisers into compliance, presumably in the hope 
of enhancing the value to “official sponsors” of the right to mention the Big 




(mentioning recoveries ranging from $48 for players featured on game roster to $15,000 for 
named plaintiffs). 
103 See, e.g., Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “even if an 
athlete wished to license his image to EA, the athlete could not do so without destroying 
amateur status”). 
104 Plaintiff’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 15, Sarver v. Hurt Locker, LLC, 
No. 2:10-cv-09034-JHN-JC, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010).  
105 See Steve Baird, The NFL’s Super Bowl Trademark Nonsense, DUETSBLOG (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://www.duetsblog.com/2015/01/articles/trademarks/the-nfls-super-bowl-
trademark-nonsense/ [https://perma.cc/HWK4-QCAQ] (“Advertisers—fearful of NFL legal 
action—strain and contort to avoid the two words that could make out a nominative fair use 
of the Super Bowl trademark, opting instead for pairs of other code words like ‘Super 
Sunday,’ the ‘Big Game,’ ‘Super Party,’ or ‘Superb Owl’ coverage.”). 
106 Indeed, the NFL tried to register The Big Game to prevent even this reference to its 
winter sporting event. See Peter Lattman, The NFL Punts on Trademarking “The Big 
Game”, WALL STREET J.: L. BLOG (May 25, 2007, 9:17 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2007/05/25/the-nfl-punts-on-trademarking-the-big-game/ [https://perma.cc/U963-SVW8]. It 
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other entities to clamp down on sale of merchandise bearing any relationship to 
their logos or colors.107 Encouraged by the normative trend toward an unjust 
enrichment approach to trademark law, brand owners have vigorously pursued 
licensing markets to optimize the profits they can earn from their marks.108 As 
a result, they often object to any perceived threat to those markets, even by 
parties engaged in expressive or nominative use. 
In other contexts, mark owners appear motivated by a desire to squelch 
commentary or to control the mental associations that consumers have 
regarding their marks. The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (“NAACP”), for example, threatened an anti-abortion group 
that used its trademark in an online article criticizing its position on 
abortion.109 The state of Louisiana sued MoveOn.org for creating billboards 
that used the state’s tourism logo to parody Governor Jindal’s position on 
abortion.110 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued a comedy duo for staging a 
fake press conference announcing a change in the Chamber’s position on 
climate change.111 
If courts are concerned about trademark holders abusing their rights in an 
effort to prevent nominative or expressive uses, they should firm up these 
limiting doctrines to eliminate the plausibility of some of these questionable 
claims. The law has arguably improved with regard to expressive uses; courts 
could further improve matters by not letting confusion in through the back 
door with respect to nominative fair use. Only after achieving greater doctrinal 
 
failed, of course, because that term has long been used in connection with an annual football 
game between University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford. Id. The International 
Olympic Committee has taken similar actions with respect to use of the OLYMPIC name or 
logo, going so far as to persuade host countries to pass legislation prohibiting even non-
confusing uses of Olympic-related names and symbols. See Susan Corbett & Alexandra 
Sims, Sui Generis Protection for Sporting Emblems and Words: A Triumph of Pragmatism 
Over Principle, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., forthcoming 2016); Jeré 
Longman, Where Even Sausage Rings Are Put on the Chopping Block, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2012), http://nyti.ms/1Tuh9Op [https://perma.cc/VX39-Z3D2] (discussing how a butcher 
was told to remove the Olympic rings he had placed on a sign outside of his shop). 
107 See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel 
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of university 
on its claims that defendant infringed by selling t-shirts featuring school colors and other 
trademarks). 
108 See Pete Canalichio, Brand Licensing Provides More Outlets for Profit and Exposure, 
ENTREPRENEUR (May 23, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/234163 
[https://perma.cc/8MPC-9KB7] (discussing the benefits of licensing a brand). 
109 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015). 
110 Dardenne v. MoveOn.org, No. 14-00150-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 1364854, at *4 (M.D. 
La. Apr. 7, 2014). 
111 See Bill Donahue, Six Ways IP Has Been Used to Attack Critics, LAW360 (June 3, 
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/663167/print?section=media [https://perma.cc/ 
3QPJ-MZAL].  
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clarity can courts take the next step of imposing sanctions or other costs 
against parties that assert abusive or overreaching claims.112 
Clarifying these doctrines can address many examples of trademark-holder 
overreaching—cases in which the defendant has some legitimate interest in 
referencing the trademark holder either directly or through evocation. A whole 
other species of purported bullying, however, involves improbable claims of 
infringement against parties whose marks happen to resemble a protected one. 
Take Monster Mini Golf, for example, facing a charge of infringement by 
Monster Cable.113 Or the claim that EAT MORE KALE t-shirts infringe rights 
on a fast food chain’s EAT MOR CHIKIN mark.114 Here, too, ambiguities in 
trademark doctrine make the claims difficult to disregard, but it’s hard to 
imagine that the trademark holder is harmed—or even that it loses a licensing 
opportunity—as a result of the use. It might appear, then, that trademark 
holders act irrationally when they object to such uses. But the doctrine actually 
encourages them to do so, in two distinct ways. 
The first way in which the doctrine encourages aggressive behavior is 
through the oft-repeated trope that trademark holders must police their marks. 
In reality, trademark holders’ obligation to police is more limited than some 
trademark holders appear to believe; they cannot lose their rights, for example, 
by failing to object to uses that do not rise to the level of infringement.115 But 
the law does require trademark holders to take certain enforcement steps in 
order to preserve their rights, and the very ambiguities that create notice 
problems for putative defendants may well encourage trademark holders to 
take an “object first, analyze later” approach to enforcement. And in some 
circumstances, at least—particularly the context of genericide—the doctrine 
 
112 See, e.g., Manta, supra note 2, at 863 (“An excessively blurry line between forceful 
but legitimate enforcement and bullying is bound to render judicial sanctions ineffective.”). 
See generally Grinvald, supra note 90. 
113 Steve Stecklow, The Scariest Monster of All Sues for Trademark Infringement, WALL 
STREET J. (Apr. 4, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123869022704882969 
[https://perma.cc/8A5E-4GD3] (exploring the claims against Monster Mini Golf and 
explaining that “[o]ver the years, [Monster Cable] has gone after purveyors of monster-
branded auto transmissions, slot machines, glue, carpet-cleaning machines and an energy 
drink, as well as a woman who sells ‘Junk Food Monster’ kids’ T-shirts that promote good 
eating habits”). 
114 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
115 E.g., ProFitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Pro-Fit Orthopedic & Sports Physical 
Therapy P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff should not be obligated to sue 
until its right to protection has ripened such that plaintiff knew or should have known . . . 
that [plaintiff] had a provable infringement claim . . . .”). See generally Sheff, supra note 2, 
at 883 (“But the duty to police is not absolute—not every forbearance from enforcement 
will negatively affect a mark owner’s legal rights—and clients should know about that as 
well.”); Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1259 (D. Or. 
2007) (rejecting argument that failure to object to third-party use of related but distinct 
marks could constitute abandonment of asserted trademark). 
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does effectively require trademark holders to pay attention to third-party use of 
their mark, lest they lose rights in the mark.116 Sandy Rierson and Deven Desai 
have suggested adjustments that would reduce the burden on trademark holders 
to police non-branding use of terms that have both trademark and generic 
significance.117 More generally, trademark law would benefit from greater 
clarity about the duty to police. 
Misconceptions of the duty to police, however, may play a smaller role in 
encouraging trademark aggression than another, far more intractable, feature of 
trademark law: the notion that “stronger” trademarks get more robust legal 
rights than “weaker” ones. Several rules of trademark law offer broader legal 
protection to parties that have succeeded in creating space between their marks 
and others—even when those others sell products that bear no relation to the 
trademark holder’s. These doctrines arguably encourage trademark holders to 
object to others’ trademarks, without regard to whether those parties are 
threatening confusion or causing other harm. Indeed, one could argue that, in 
light of these doctrines, many cases of purported bullying involve trademark 
holders making rational attempts to maximize the value of their assets—not 
because they risk losing their marks if they fail to object, but because their 
rights will be more valuable if their objection succeeds.118 
The most obvious of these doctrines is anti-dilution law, which gives owners 
of “famous” marks the right to prevent the “dilution” of their marks through 
tarnishment or blurring.119 Critics have questioned the basis for these laws, 
contending, among other things, that the strongest marks may be the least 
likely to suffer loss of distinctiveness from other parties’ use of similar 
 
116 See Grinvald, supra note 2, at 640 (“Since the expanded scope of trademark 
protection is afforded to stronger trademarks, trademark owners have a burden of either 
increasing the strength of their trademark, or ensuring that their strong trademark does not 
lose its strength.”); cf. Kiser, supra note 2, at 229-32 (discussing how the actual risk of 
losing a trademark due to failure to police is “highly exaggerated”). Sandra Rierson and 
Deven Desai have taken issue with this aspect of genericism doctrine, and have advocated a 
more nuanced approach that would preserve trademark protection for marks that have 
trademark significance, even if they also have a generic meaning. See generally Deven R. 
Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1789 (2007). 
117 Desai & Rierson, supra note 116, at 1792 (“[W]e contend that the genericism doctrine 
should be re-anchored to focus on the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the 
consumer in commercial contexts.”). 
118 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11.91 (“[T]he corporate owners of 
trademarks have a duty to protect and preserve the corporation’s trademark assets though 
vigilant policing and appropriate acts of enforcement. Inaction will inevitably lead to 
erosion of those key corporate assets: the marks that identify and distinguish the 
corporation’s goods and services.”). 
119 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
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signs.120 Yet the law provides this powerful form of protection to famous 
marks based on the assumption that use of similar marks by unauthorized 
parties may whittle away the famous mark’s distinctiveness. And in deciding 
whether such whittling away is likely to occur, courts are instructed to 
consider, among other things, “the extent to which the owner of the famous 
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.”121 Mark owners 
aspiring to attain “famous mark” status thus have an incentive to object to 
third-party use of their mark, even on different products and when confusion is 
unlikely. 
The bias in favor of “strong” marks extends beyond dilution laws. In 
infringement analysis, strong marks get a thumb on the scale in proving 
likelihood of confusion.122 Strength, moreover, turns in part on distance 
between the claimed mark and others in the marketplace.123 In gauging that 
distance, courts don’t always limit themselves to marks that are close 
enough—in nature and in connection with their goods—to justify a claim of 
infringement. Some courts also take into account whether marks sharing 
 
120 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2006) (“While two identical 
marks coexisting in the same marketplace will by definition negate each other’s uniqueness, 
they need not blur each other, i.e., they need not increase consumer search costs or 
otherwise require consumers to ‘think for a moment’ before recognizing the respective 
sources of the marks. This is especially the case when one of the marks is very strong.”); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 507, 542-44 (2008) (“Instead of a tree of associations, a better metaphor for 
mental models of strong brands might be a city with numerous one-way streets.”); cf. 
Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive 
Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 272 (2000) (“[S]ome brands, such as 
Continental Airlines, are so familiar to consumers . . . that recall of their original product 
category is largely immune to trademark dilution.”); Tushnet, supra, at 541 n.170 
(discussing the continued strength of the Hyatt and Lexis brands despite exposure to 
trademark-dilution). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
122 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Fame of an opposer’s mark or marks, if it exists, plays a ‘dominant role in the 
process of balancing the DuPont factors.”); Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 
963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A strong mark . . . casts a long shadow which 
competitors must avoid.”); Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1816, 1822 (T.T.A.B. 2015) (finding WINEBUD as a mark for wine-related 
products confusingly similar to BUD as a mark for beer and noting that “[a]lthough fame is 
‘insufficient, standing alone, to establish likelihood of confusion,’ . . . a finding of fame puts 
a heavy thumb on Opposer’s side of the scale” (citations omitted)). See generally Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multi-Factor Test for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2006) (describing strength of the mark as one of the four factors most 
likely to determine outcomes in likelihood-of-confusion analyses).  
123 See Beebe, supra note 122, at 1599 (describing how most Circuits view the strength 
of a mark and the proximity of the goods as the strongest factors). 
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similar features appear in fields “at least broadly . . . related to [the trademark 
holder’s] business.”124 As a result, the existence of somewhat similar marks, on 
somewhat similar products, can count against a trademark holder in any 
infringement suit involving its mark.125 Given this, it’s unsurprising that 
trademark holders object when they perceive any encroachment into the space 
surrounding their mark. The encroachment may not confuse consumers, and 
trademark holders’ failure to object to it may not result in loss of rights in their 
mark; but it can affect the value of their trademarks and the scope of their legal 
rights going forward. For this reason, Professor McCarthy warns that “[t]he 
only way a trademark owner can prevent the market from being crowded with 
similar marks is to undertake an assertive program of policing adjacent 
‘territory’ and suing those who edge too close.”126 And given the inherent 
fuzziness of trademark’s boundaries, judging what comes “too close” can, 
itself, be daunting. 
I don’t mean to serve as an apologist for overreaching trademark holders. I 
have written elsewhere about the costs of expanding trademark rights without 
regard to confusion, and I believe that as the effective scope of trademark 
rights broadens, both competitors and consumers can suffer. My point here is 
that the law has not only failed in its function of delineating clear boundaries 
of trademark holder rights; it has arguably made things worse, by defining 
trademarks’ value, at least in part, by reference to uses that fall outside any 
reasonable definition of those boundaries. Recognizing this reality can help to 
put some cases of purported bullying into a different perspective. When a 
lawyer for Monster Energy Drinks recommended that the company object to a 
 
124 PostX Corp. v. docSpace Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(concluding that marks that “clearly use, to varying degrees, elements of plaintiff’s mark’s 
design” by businesses that are “part of a field which at least broadly would include or be 
related to plaintiff’s business” weaken plaintiff’s mark); see also One Indus., LLC, v. Jim 
O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The record, however, 
contains several examples of similar O marks used by different companies, including 
Oakley, OGIO, and Alloy MX. Such use of other ‘O’ symbols weakens the Rounded O’ 
mark.”); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1511 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding 
weakness of mark demonstrated by evidence that, when applicant sought to register mark, 
“there were more than 70 trademark registrations, pending applications for registration or 
renewal, or publications-for-opposition that incorporated the term ‘100%,’ and . . . some of 
those marks were for cosmetic products” (emphasis added)); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that evidence 
“abundantly established existing third-party use of the name ‘Sun,’ both within and without 
the financial community”); JL Beverage Co., v. Beam, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (D. 
Nev. 2012) (“When considering whether the senior mark is weakened by its presence in a 
‘crowded field’ of similar marks, the relevant field is ‘a field which at least broadly would 
include or be related to [the] plaintiff’s business.’”).  
125 Not all courts follow this rule. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that use of 
similar marks in unrelated markets is “irrelevant” to infringement analysis. See Eclipse 
Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990). 
126 MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11.91. 
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brewery’s sale of Vermonster beer,127 she probably did not perceive any real 
risk of confusion or dilution of the Monster Energy marks. But she may well 
have concluded that objecting to any drink-related use of monster would help 
to preserve the strength of her client’s mark, in general, in future cases.128 This 
doesn’t mean that the world is better off as a result of that action; but it does 
mean that the accused bully had a plausible reason for its aggression. If we 
want to curb that aggression, we should modify trademark law’s incentives. 
III. WHAT’S TO BE DONE? 
This Essay has contended that three factors—vague legal boundaries, non-
transparent enforcement mechanisms, and doctrines that reward aggression—
may be fueling aggressive behavior by trademark and right-of-publicity 
claimants. It makes no empirical claim about the existence or frequency of 
such overreaching, but in light of these factors, it would come as no surprise if 
it turned out to be quite common. 
If these three features combine to create an environment conducive to 
overreaching, the tweaking any one of them could help, at least around the 
edges. In the right-of-publicity context, industries built upon referential 
expressive works are virtually crying out for clearer notice about the balance 
between publicity rights and creative expression. The prevailing ad hoc 
approach for distinguishing between speech and exploitation leaves too much 
uncertainty about when the use of individuals’ name, likeness, or identifying 
characteristics requires permission. Of course, if certainty alone is the goal, 
courts could resolve the situation in either direction, by adopting bright-line 
rules that favor either side. A rule that every profit-oriented use of celebrity 
identity requires permission, for example, would provide clear notice, though it 
would arguably trample time-honored values of free expression. At the other 
end, courts could bring greater certainty by adopting a test like Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, which involves less subjective balancing and more reliance on 
objective questions about the relationship between the individual’s identity and 
the expressive work.129 
 
127 Meg Marco, Brewer Sued By Monster Energy Drink Asks America For Help, 
CONSUMERIST (Oct. 14, 2009), http://consumerist.com/2009/10/14/brewer-sued-by-monster-
energy-drink-asks-america-for-help/ [https://perma.cc/4BGE-VDYB] (describing how a 
small Vermont brewer was sued by the maker of the Monster Energy drink for trademark 
infringement for the brewer’s ‘Vermonster’ beer). 
128 Indeed, in at least one case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a successful trademark 
enforcement strategy could make a “crowded field” less crowded. See Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Abercrombie presented 
evidence that its trademark enforcement had resulted in several competitors abandoning 
their use of moose images. It was not clearly inconsistent for Abercrombie to assert that the 
field is now less crowded.”). 
129 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the Rogers standard). 
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In the trademark context, there is room for adjustment to all three of the 
levers that may contribute to overreaching. First and foremost, courts could 
reduce trademark law’s notice failures by clarifying the boundaries of 
trademark rights. A variety of tools could achieve this purpose, alone or in 
combination. A robust trademark use doctrine, for example, would add 
doctrinal clarity by distinguishing between direct and contributory 
infringement claims. Furthermore, a materiality requirement would discourage 
legal claims for harmless infringement, by discouraging lawsuits over 
attenuated risks of confusion over association. Most promisingly, courts could 
add rigor and clarity to trademark law’s defenses, carving out categories of 
protected use that fall safely beyond trademark holders’ reach. Any level of 
increased doctrinal clarity would not only help with the resolution of individual 
cases, but it could enable “best practices” initiatives and other efforts that 
could empower targets to assess the credibility of cease-and-desist letters and 
other legal threats. 
Beyond addressing these substantive notice failures, courts, legislatures, 
professional organizations, and members of the public can help to influence the 
role that cease-and-desist practice plays in contributing to trademark holder 
overreaching. Leah Chan Grinvald has demonstrated that public shaming can 
play a powerful role in dampening trademark holders’ aggression; in her most 
recent article, she has proposed some initiatives designed to curb outrageous 
cease-and-desist letters.130 Irina Manta and others have suggested 
alternatives.131 To the extent that these efforts can reduce the expected benefit 
to trademark holders from sending letters that reflect unreasonable 
interpretations of their rights, they can at least partially address the self-
reinforcing, ratcheting-up effect of trademark law’s non-transparent 
enforcement scheme. And in the registration context, the PTO could consider 
adopting policies that discourage unreasonable oppositions—a practice that is 
likely to grow in importance in the wake of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis 
Industries Inc.132 
Finally, courts should reconsider the doctrines that effectively encourage 
trademark holders to reach as broadly as possible in building fences around 
their marks. To some extent, these doctrines are intuitive and inevitable. It 
makes sense, for example, to allow only weak protection to marks in a very 
“crowded field,” because none of the marks is likely to have much source-
identifying meaning to consumers. But the converse does not necessarily 
hold—i.e., that especially strong marks are uniquely vulnerable to confusion or 
 
130 See generally Grinvald, supra note 90. 
131 See Manta, supra note 2, at 853 (suggesting that the Patent & Trademark Office make 
“preliminary determinations about the validity of infringement claims” so that “trademark 
owners could record evidence of policing while being discouraged from making frivolous 
claims.”). 
132 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (holding that administrative decisions by the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board may have preclusive effect in civil litigation). 
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dilution, such that they need an extra-broad scope of protection. It may be, in 
fact, that the strongest marks are the least vulnerable to confusion or dilution, 
because consumers will continue to recognize them, regardless of whether 
other parties adopt somewhat similar terms.133 In light of the negative effect 
that the “strong marks” preference appears to have on trademark enforcement, 
it is worth at least considering whether it is serving a legitimate function. 
One recent development might prove important in shifting enforcement 
incentives in trademark law. In the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
LLC,134 some courts have begun to soften the presumption of irreparable harm 
in trademark suits, instead requiring trademark holders to demonstrate a real 
threat of injury.135 If this trend continues, the expected reward from bringing 
trademark claims will diminish, because courts may find that minor confusion 
rarely threatens meaningful harm.136 If trademark holders are denied injunctive 
relief in these cases, they will have less power to influence the use of marks by 
third parties that may make consumers think of them, but that do them no 
harm. Indeed, we might all be better off in a world in which strong trademarks 
had more and better company. 
 
 
133 Tushnet, supra note 120, at 541-42 (“[I]n the dilution experiments, certain-well 
known brands [such as Lexis and Hyatt] resist dilution even without reminder ads.”).  
134 547 U.S. 399 (2005) (holding that the traditional four-factor equitable test applies 
when determining whether to award permanent injunctive relief, which includes 
demonstrating the suffering of “irreparable harm”). 
135 Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that in light of eBay, “a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act is not entitled 
to a presumption of irreparable harm when seeking a preliminary injunction and must 
demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely”); Herb Reed Enters. v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 
F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We now join other circuits in holding that the eBay 
principle—that a plaintiff must establish irreparable harm—applies to a preliminary 
injunction in a trademark infringement case.”). 
136 Indeed, at least in the Ninth Circuit, even a showing of actual consumer confusion 
may not be enough to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., 
No. 8:15-CV-01010-ODW-MRW, 2015 WL 4694075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). 
